Silence is safest: Information disclosure when the audience's preferences are uncertain *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bond, Philip; Zeng, Yao
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.08.012
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 178-193
• 关键词: Information disclosure; risk-aversion; uncertainty; preferences

摘要

We examine voluntary disclosure decisions when firms are uncertain about audience preferences and are risk averse. In contrast to classic unraveling results, some firms remain silent in equilibrium. Silence is safer than disclosure; silence reduces the sensitivity of a firm's payoff to audience preferences. Increases in firm (audience) risk-aversion reduce (increase) disclosure. Our model explains why some firms do not disclose earnings breakdowns, executive compensation, or Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance when they face diverse audiences, and why they disclose less under regulatory rules mandating that disclosure be entirely public. (c) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ )