Blood in the water: The value of antitakeover provisions during market shocks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guernsey, Scott; Sepe, Simone M.; Serfling, Matthew
• 署名单位: University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Arizona; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; European Corporate Governance Institute
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.12.009
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1070-1096
• 关键词: Antitakeover provisions; Market shocks; Firm value; Takeover premiums; Relationship-specific investments

摘要

During market-wide shocks that cause large drops in stock prices, firms with more state endorsed antitakeover provisions (ATPs) experience smaller declines in value. Two channels appear to drive this finding. First, by giving boards more bargaining power to fight opportunistic bids, firms with more ATPs extract higher takeover premiums during market shocks. Second, having more ATPs attenuates the effect of market shocks on firm value by protecting relationship-specific investments with stakeholders from disruptive takeovers. Our results suggest that ATPs benefit shareholders during market shocks when firm values are abnormally low and represent one advantage of incorporating in states with more ATPs. Published by Elsevier B.V.