Voting and trading: The shareholder?s dilemma

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meirowitz, Adam; Pi, Shaoting
• 署名单位: Yale University; Iowa State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.05.001
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1073-1096
• 关键词: Shareholder voting; corporate governance; information aggregation; strategic voting

摘要

We study governance when shareholders vote and can also buy or sell shares. We find that voting for the policy that one believes is better for the firm maximizes portfolio value only when pivotal; otherwise, it is better to vote against one's information, distort the market, and then trade at the distorted price. Equilibrium voting informativeness balances these forces and is demonstrably low. As the number of shareholders grows, the proba-bility of making the correct decision becomes lower than the informational quality of just one shareholder's private signal. Despite this, shareholders extract information rents from trading and thus obtain additional value from their private information. These effects are related to the level of direct information leakage in the market. The predicted patterns of trading and market volatility help reconcile several debates.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.