Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harris, Milton; Raviv, Artur
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq081
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 4115
• 关键词: information; authority

摘要

This article addresses the issue of whether shareholders would be better off with enhanced control over corporate decisions. The issue has been hotly debated in the recent literature. Our main contribution is to use formal modeling to uncover some factors overlooked in these arguments. For example, we show that claims that shareholder control would reduce value because shareholders lack sufficient information to make important decisions or because they have a non-value-maximizing agenda are flawed. We also show, however, that even if shareholders seek to maximize firm value and can delegate decisions to management, shareholders should not control all major decisions. (JEL G30, G34, G38)