Evidence on the Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ozbas, Oguzhan; Scharfstein, David S.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhp071
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 581
• 关键词: INEFFICIENT INVESTMENT; financing constraints; INFORMATION; diversification; allocation; RESOURCES; matter; FIRMS

摘要

This article documents differences between the Q-sensitivity of investment of stand-alone firms and unrelated segments of conglomerate firms. Unrelated segments exhibit lower Q-sensitivity of investment than stand-alone firms. This fact is driven by unrelated segments of conglomerate firms that tend to invest less than stand-alone firms in high-Q industries. This finding is robust to matching on industry, year, size, age, and profitability. The differences are more pronounced in conglomerates in which top management has small ownership stakes, suggesting that agency problems explain the investment behavior of conglomerates. (JEL D21, D23, G31)