Cross-listings, antitakeover defenses, and the insulation hypothesis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tsang, Albert; Yang, Nan; Zheng, Lingyi
• 署名单位: Hong Kong Polytechnic University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.08.003
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 259-276
• 关键词: Cross-listing; Takeover deterrent; Poison pills

摘要

This paper tests a theory conjecturing that cross-listing can insulate firms from potential hostile takeovers owing to the increased cost concern of bidders. We find a significant and positive relation between the corporate control threat and the likelihood that firms cross list in a foreign country. Firms facing takeover threats are more likely to choose hosting countries with greater accounting differences from the US GAAP. Subsample evidence suggests that cross-listing is more likely to be used as an antitakeover device if firms have foreign market exposure or when all-cash offers are less likely. Tests based on quasi-natural experiments provide further support.(c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.