Measuring the ex-ante incentive effects of creditor control rights during bankruptcy reorganization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agrawal, Ashwini; Gonzalez-Uribe, Juanita; Martinez-Correa, Jimmy
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Copenhagen Business School; Danish Finance Institute
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.09.020
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 381-408
• 关键词: bankruptcy; reorganization; liquidation; Creditors; Debtors

摘要

A large theoretical literature studies the effects of creditor control during bankruptcy proceedings on firm outcomes. Empirical work in this area mainly examines reforms to creditor control rights during liquidation. In this paper, we use administrative microdata and exploit a legal reform in Denmark to provide the first causal estimates of creditor empowerment in reorganization-the complementary bankruptcy procedure to liquidation. We find that the Danish reform led to a sharp decline in liquidations. Although few insolvent firms make use of the new reorganization procedures, we show that solvent firms improved their financial management and increased employment and investment. The findings illustrate the empirical importance of reorganization rules on the incentives of stakeholders outside of bankruptcy. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.