Loan guarantees, bank underwriting policies and financial stability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carletti, Elena; Leonello, Agnese; Marquez, Robert
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; European Central Bank; University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.04.013
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 260-295
• 关键词: Panic runs; Fundamental runs; Bank monitoring; Charter value

摘要

Loan guarantees represent a form of government intervention to support bank lending. However, their use raises concerns as to their effect on bank risk-taking incentives. In a model of financial fragility that incorporates bank capital and a bank incentive problem, we show that loan guarantees reduce depositor runs and improve bank underwriting standards, except for the most poorly capitalized banks. We highlight a novel feedback effect between banks' underwriting choices and depositors' run decisions, and show that the effect of loan guarantees on banks' incentives is different from that of other types of guarantees, such as deposit insurance.