Partisanship in loan pricing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dagostino, Ramona; Gao, Janet; Ma, Pengfei
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Georgetown University; Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103717
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Partisanship; POLITICS; Syndicated Loan Pricing; credit spreads

摘要

Does partisanship influence the way investors price financial assets? Using voter registration data of bankers originating large corporate loans, we show that bankers whose party differs from that of the U.S. President charge 7% higher loan spreads than other bankers. This effect holds regardless of borrowers' partisanship, and becomes stronger for politically active bankers and when partisan media exhibit greater disagreement. Bankers do not match disproportionately with co-partisan borrowers but they lead syndicates more frequently with copartisan bankers. Our results are not driven by bank or borrower fundamentals, but suggest that investor optimism, driven by political alignment, shapes asset prices.