CEO compensation: Evidence from the field

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103718
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Executive compensation; contract theory; ceo incentives; fairness; Survey

摘要

We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. We find that directors face constraints beyond participation and incentives, and that pay matters not to finance consumption but to address CEOs' fairness concerns. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy, leading to lower levels and one-size-fits-all structures. Shareholders are the main source of constraints, suggesting directors and investors disagree on how to maximize value. Intrinsic motivation and reputation are seen as stronger motivators than incentive pay. Even with strong portfolio incentives, flow pay responds to performance to fairly recognize the CEO's contribution.