Token-based platform governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abadi, Joseph; Brunnermeier, Markus
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103951
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Utility tokens; platforms; DeFi; corporate governance

摘要

We develop a model to compare the governance of traditional shareholder-owned platforms to that of platforms that issue tokens. A traditional shareholder governance structure leads a platform to extract rents from its users. A platform that issues tokens for its services can mitigate this rent extraction, as rent extraction lowers the platform owners' token seigniorage revenues. However, this mitigation from issuing service tokensis effective only if the platform can commit itself not to dilute the service tokensubsequently. Issuing hybrid tokensthat bundle claims on the platform's services and its profits enhances efficiency even absent ex-ante commitment power. Finally, giving users the right to vote on platform policies, by contrast, redistributes surplus but does not necessarily enhance efficiency.