Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouwman, Christa H. S.
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhr034
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2358
• 关键词: Boards; geography; COMPENSATION; determinants; BUSY

摘要

How are governance practices propagated across firms? This article proposes, and empirically verifies, that observed governance practices are partly the outcome of network effects among firms with common directors. While firms attempt to select directors whose other directorships are at firms with similar governance practices (familiarity effect), this matching of governance practices is imperfect because other factors also affect the director choice. This generates an influence effect as directors acquainted with different practices at other firms influence the firm's governance to move toward the practices of those other firms. These network effects cause governance practices to converge. (JEL D80, G32, 034, R10)