Systemic bank runs without aggregate risk: How a misallocation of liquidity may trigger a solvency crisis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Altermatt, Lukas; van Buggenum, Hugo; Voellmy, Lukas
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Swiss National Bank (SNB)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103929
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Fragility; Deposit freezes; Emergency liquidity

摘要

We develop a general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs. The key novelty is the way in which the banking system's assets and liabilities are connected. Banks issue loans to entrepreneurs who sell goods to households, which in turn pay for the goods by redeeming bank deposits. The return on bank assets is thus contingent on households being able to withdraw their deposits. In a run, not all households that wish to consume manage to withdraw, since part of banks' cash reserves end up in the hands of households without consumption needs. This misallocation of liquidity lowers revenues of entrepreneurs and bank asset returns, thereby rationalising the run. Interventions that restrict redemptions in a run can be self-defeating due to their negative effect on demand in goods markets. We show how runs can sometimes be prevented with combinations of deposit freezes and redemption penalties as well as with the provision of emergency liquidity.