Strategic Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aslan, Hadiye; Kumar, Praveen
• 署名单位: University of Houston System; University of Houston
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhs062
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 2257
• 关键词: corporate-ownership; Investor protection; measurement error; private benefits; incomplete contracts; EQUITY OWNERSHIP; credit spreads; voting-rights; bank loans; Firm value

摘要

We theoretically and empirically address the endogeneity of corporate ownership structure and the cost of debt, with a novel emphasis on the role of control concentration in post-default firm restructuring. Control concentration raises agency costs of debt, and dominant shareholders trade off private benefits of control against higher borrowing costs in choosing their ownership stakes. Based on our theoretical predictions, and using an international sample of syndicated loans and unique dynamic ownership structure data, we present new evidence on the firm- and macro-level determinants of corporate control concentration and the cost of debt.