Bank heterogeneity and financial stability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goldstein, Itay; Kopytov, Alexandr; Shen, Lin; Xiang, Haotian
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Rochester; INSEAD Business School; Peking University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103934
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: financial fragility; fire sales; strategic complementarity; Bank run

摘要

We propose a model of the financial system in which banks are individually prone to runs and connected through fire sales. Strategic complementarities within and across banks amplify each other, making heterogeneity in bank risks a key factor shaping the fragility of each bank and the entire system. As long as different banks are interconnected, an increase in heterogeneity stabilizes all banks. Reductions in asset commonality, bank-specific disclosures, and even broad-based policies such as asset purchases and liquidity requirements can enhance stability by increasing bank heterogeneity.