Information-based pricing in specialized lending

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blickle, Kristian; He, Zhiguo; Huang, Jing; Parlatore, Cecilia
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104135
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: credit market competition; Common value auction with asymmetric; bidders; Winner's curse; Winning bids versus bids; information acquisition

摘要

We study how competition between asymmetrically informed banks, one specialized and one nonspecialized, affects loan prices. Both banks possess general signals regarding the borrower's quality, which they use to screen loans. The specialized bank also has access to a specialized signal on which it bases its loan pricing. This private information-based pricing makes the specialized bank bid more aggressively, mitigating the informational rent effect that gives it monopolistic power. Our findings explain why loans from specialized lenders feature lower interest rates and better ex post performance. Supporting empirical evidence emphasizes the role of specialized information in shaping credit market outcomes.