Institutional Investors and Mutual Fund Governance: Evidence from Retail-Institutional Fund Twins

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Evans, Richard B.; Fahlenbrach, Ruediger
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhs105
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 3530
• 关键词: BOARD STRUCTURE; performance; SHAREHOLDERS; OWNERSHIP; US; persistence; incentives; management; selection; COSTS

摘要

Advisors often manage multiple versions of a fund. These twins have the same manager and similar performance but are sold to different investors with differing abilities to select and monitor managers. Comparing investor flows in retail and institutional twins, we find that institutional investors are more sensitive to high fees and poor risk-adjusted performance. Consistent with the reduction of agency problems from greater monitoring, retail funds with an institutional twin outperform other retail funds by 1.5% per year. After the institutional twin is created, expenses decrease while measures of managerial effort at the retail fund increase.