Information technology and lender competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vives, Xavier; Ye, Zhiqiang
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Zhejiang University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103957
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: credit; monitoring; FinTech; price discrimination; moral hazard; regulation

摘要

We study how information technology (IT) affects lender competition, entrepreneurs' investment, and welfare in a spatial model. The effects of an IT improvement depend on whether it weakens the influence of lender- borrower distance on monitoring costs. If it does, it has a hump-shaped effect on entrepreneurs' investment and social welfare. If not, competition intensity does not vary, improving lender profits, entrepreneurs' investment, and social welfare. When entrepreneurs' moral hazard problem is severe, IT-induced competition is more likely to reduce investment and welfare. We also find that lenders' price discrimination is not welfare-optimal. Our results are consistent with received empirical work on lending to SMEs.