Distributed ledgers and the governance of money

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Auer, Raphael; Monnet, Cyril; Shin, Hyun Song
• 署名单位: University of Bern; Study Center Gerzensee
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104026
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Market design; money; Distributed ledger technology; DLT blockchain; Cryptocurrencies; Decentralized finance (DeFi); Global game; consensus; Stablecoins

摘要

Distributed ledgers promise to enable the classical vision of money as a universal transaction record. But is it ever optimal to update a ledger through decentralized consensus? Analyzing an exchange economy with credit, we show that centralized updating is optimal when long-term rewards are more valued, minimizing redundant validation costs and maximizing economic surplus. Decentralization becomes preferable under weaker intertemporal incentives and when validators are drawn from market participants. We show how competing ledgers - anonymous or identified, permissioned or permissionless - can achieve socially optimal outcomes even in low-trust environments. Our framework provides a foundation for designing robust and efficient ledger systems.