Investor Heterogeneity, Investor-Management Disagreement and Share Repurchases

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Huang, Sheng; Thakor, Anjan V.
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hht043
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2453
• 关键词: DUTCH-AUCTION; information asymmetry; corporate governance; STOCK REPURCHASES; tender offers; payout policy; SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS; MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY; FIXED-PRICE; MARKET

摘要

This paper develops and tests a new theoretical explanation for stock repurchases. Investors may disagree with the manager about the firm's investment projects. Arepurchase causes a change in the investor base as investors who are most likely to disagree with the manager tender their shares. Therefore, a firm is more likely to buy back shares when the level of investor-management agreement is lower, and agreement improves as a consequence. Moreover, dispersion of opinion among investors cannot explain repurchase activity once the stock price and investor-management agreement are controlled for. Overall, the evidence is consistent with firms strategically using repurchases to improve alignment between management and shareholders.