CEO turnover and director reputation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: von Meyerinck, Felix; Romer, Jonas; Schmid, Markus
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; University of St Gallen; University of St Gallen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103971
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: CEO TURNOVER; Director elections; Director reputation; CEO succession; Shareholder voting

摘要

This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Directors are not penalized for an involvement in a turnover per se but for forced CEO turnovers that are related to governance failures by the board. Our results challenge the widespread view that forcing out a CEO can generally be understood as a sign of a well-functioning corporate governance.