Maximal extractable value and allocative inefficiencies in public blockchains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Capponi, Agostino; Jia, Ruizhe; Wang, Kanye Ye
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Stanford University; University of Macau; University of Macau; University of Macau
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104132
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Allocative efficiency; market design; Blockchain; Maximal extractable value; Private pool

摘要

The blockchain settlement layer facilitates systematic frontrunning, resulting in inefficient block-space allocation. Private transaction pools can reduce these inefficiencies and enhance welfare. However, full adoption is limited by misaligned incentives between users and validators. Validators are reluctant to forgo rents they earn from frontrunning-referred to as maximal extractable value-leading to a partial adoption equilibrium in which frontrunning persists. Our empirical analysis of Ethereums Flashbots private pool supports these findings: validators earn higher revenues, users facing greater frontrunning risk are more likely to use the private pool, and attackers cost-to-revenue ratios in private pools converge to one.