Specialization, Productivity, and Financing Constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marquez, Robert; Yavuz, M. Deniz
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hht042
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2961
• 关键词: CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION; liquidation values

摘要

We analyze optimal financial contracts when the specificity of investments is endogenous. Specialization decreases the liquidation value of assets, but improves the asset's long-term productivity. While the former is known to make financing more difficult, we show that the latter can ease financing constraints and increase financing capacity by improving an entrepreneur's incentive to repay. The overall impact of specialization on the terms of financing depends on which effect is more important. Specialization decisions interact with the nature of investments, their timing, the need for outside financing, and an entrepreneur's ability to commit to a level of specialization.