Do intermediaries improve GSE lending? Evidence from proprietary GSE data☆

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bosshardt, Joshua; Kakhbod, Ali; Kermani, Amir
• 署名单位: Federal Housing Finance Agency; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104082
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Mortgage lenders; Underwriting risk; Overlays; Nonbanks

摘要

We analyze the trade-offs of having intermediaries originate government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) mortgages using proprietary GSE data. We first find evidence of lenders pricing for observable and unobservable default risk independently of the GSEs. We then develop and estimate a model of competitive lending in which lenders have skin-in-the-game and conduct additional screening beyond the GSEs' criteria. Lenders reduce costs via screening but also charge markups. On net, interest rates are higher compared to a counterfactual effectively without intermediaries. In an extension, the observed differences between banks and nonbanks are more consistent with differences in their skin-in-the-game rather than screening quality.