Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hori, Keiichi; Osano, Hiroshi
• 署名单位: Ritsumeikan University; Kyoto University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hht027
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2620
• 关键词: convertible securities; DYNAMIC AGENCY; moral hazard; venture; CONTRACTS; DECISION; MARKET; performance; creation; DESIGN

摘要

We explore a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist (VC)-entrepreneur relationship where the VC both supplies costly effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public offering (IPO), we show that optimal IPO timing is earlier under double moral hazard than under single moral hazard. Our results also indicate that the manager's compensation tends to be paid earlier under double moral hazard. We derive several comparative static results, notably that IPO timing is earlier when the need for monitoring by the VC is smaller and when the volatility of cash flows is larger.