Do Going-Private Transactions Affect Plant Efficiency and Investment?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bharath, Sreedhar; Dittmar, Amy; Sivadasan, Jagadeesh
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhu027
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1929
• 关键词: free cash flow; management buyouts; leveraged buyouts; AGENCY COSTS; BEHAVIOR; FIRMS; PRODUCTIVITY; MARKETS; gains; MODEL

摘要

We examine whether constraints on public firms affect firms' efficiency by testing if going private improves plant-level productivity relative to peer control groups. We find that, despite increases in productivity after going private, there is little evidence of efficiency gains relative to peer groups of plants constructed to control for industry, age, size, past productivity, and the endogeneity of the going-private decision. Going-private firms do extensively restructure their portfolio of plants, selling and closing plants more quickly than others. Our findings cast doubt on the view that public markets cause listed firms to operate plants less efficiently due to overinvestment but indicate that going private increases restructuring activity.