Advance Disclosure of Insider Trading
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lenkey, Stephen L.
署名单位：
U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/hhu026
发表日期：
2014
页码：
2504
关键词：
摘要：
Using a strategic rational expectations equilibrium framework, we show that forcing a well-informed insider to disclose her trades in advance tends to increase welfare for both the insider and less-informed outsiders. Advance disclosure generates price risk for the insider, and to mitigate this risk, the insider trades less aggressively on her private information. Consequently, outsiders face lower adverse selection costs, which improves risk sharing and increases welfare. The drop in trading aggressiveness also causes market efficiency to decline. Furthermore, pretrade disclosure encourages excessive risk taking but may either encourage or discourage managerial effort.