Mutual Funds and Information Diffusion: The Role of Country-Level Governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lin, Chunmei; Massa, Massimo; Zhang, Hong
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; INSEAD Business School; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhu046
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 3343
• 关键词: EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS; Investor protection; financial-markets; STOCK; performance; returns; TRANSPARENCY; determines; liquidity; analysts

摘要

We hypothesize that poor country-level governance, which makes public information less reliable, induces fund managers to increase their use of semipublic information. Utilizing data from international mutual funds and stocks over the 2000-2009 period, we find that semipublic information-related stock rebalancing can be five times higher in countries with the worst quality of governance than in countries with the best. The use of semipublic information increases price informativeness but also increases information asymmetry and reduces stock liquidity. It also intensified the price impact and liquidity crunch during the recent global financial crisis.