The Labor Market for Bankers and Regulators

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bond, Philip; Glode, Vincent
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hht132
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 2539
• 关键词: PUBLIC-SECTOR; motivation; incentives; GOVERNMENT; ECONOMICS; selection; Talent

摘要

We propose a labor market model in which agents with heterogenous ability levels choose to work as bankers or as financial regulators. When workers extract intrinsic benefits from working in regulation (such as public-sector motivation or human capital accumulation), our model jointly predicts that bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators and their compensation is more sensitive to performance. During financial booms, banks draw the best workers away from the regulatory sector and misbehavior increases. In a dynamic extension of our model, young regulators accumulate human capital and the best ones switch to banking in mid-career. (JEL G28, J24, J45)