Traders vs. Relationship Managers: Reputational Conflicts in Full-Service Investment Banks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Zhaohui; Morrison, Alan D.; Wilhelm, William J., Jr.
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; University of Oxford; Sun Yat Sen University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhu086
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1153
• 关键词: Repeated games; underwriter; INFORMATION; INNOVATION; collusion; MARKETS; CHOICE; FIRMS

摘要

We present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest. Banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients' interest; on the other hand, banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so. A behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities. The model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks, as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral- and typereputation concerns.