Testing for Information Asymmetries in Real Estate Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kurlat, Pablo; Stroebel, Johannes
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhv028
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2429
• 关键词: Adverse selection; equilibrium; COMPETITION; INVESTMENT; contagion; returns; Bubble; prices; LAND; RISK

摘要

In housing markets, neighborhood characteristics are a key source of information heterogeneity: sellers are usually better informed about neighborhood values than buyers are, but some sellers and buyers are better informed than their peers are. Consistent with predictions from a new framework for analyzing such markets with heterogeneous assets and differentially informed agents, we find that changes in the composition of sellers toward more informed sellers and sellers with a larger supply elasticity predict subsequent house price declines. This effect is larger for houses with more price exposure to neighborhood characteristics, and smaller for houses bought by buyers that are more informed.