A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acharya, Viral V.; Lambrecht, Bart M.
• 署名单位: New York University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhv026
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2534
• 关键词: research-and-development; REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION; earnings management; empirical-analysis; MANAGERIAL RENTS; Dividend policy; INFORMATION; FIRMS; equity; MODEL

摘要

We develop a theory of income and payout smoothing by firms when insiders know more about income than outside shareholders, but property rights ensure that outsiders can enforce a fair payout. Insiders set payout to meet outsiders' expectations and underproduce to manage future expectations downward. The observed income and payout process are smooth and adjust partially and over time in response to economic shocks. The smaller the inside ownership, the more severe underproduction is, resulting in an outside equity Laffer curve.