Posturing and Holdup in Innovation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Khanna, Naveen; Mathews, Richmond D.
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhv071
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2419
• 关键词: venture capitalists; stock-prices; convertible securities; INVESTMENT; MARKET; FIRMS; corporate; feedback; IMPACT; manipulation

摘要

We show that the need to posture can help solve the holdup problem inherent in many multistage relationships, including those between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Posturing arises when an informed party needs to send a strong signal to induce skeptical third parties like employees, suppliers, customers, or competitors to develop/maintain relationships with the firm or take other actions that increase firm value. In the venture capital context, this can be credibly achieved if the VC publicly invests at high prices in later rounds. This tempers holdup by shifting ex-post bargaining power toward the entrepreneur, inducing him to exert greater effort.