Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Becht, Marco; Polo, Andrea; Rossi, Stefano
• 署名单位: Solvay SA; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; European Corporate Governance Institute; Pompeu Fabra University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhw045
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 3035
• 关键词: regression-discontinuity designs; corporate governance; market valuation; stock-market; mergers; OWNERSHIP; returns; cash; destruction; OVERPAYMENT

摘要

Shareholder voting on corporate acquisitions is controversial. In most countries, acquisition decisions are delegated to boards, and shareholder approval is discretionary, which makes existing empirical studies inconclusive. We study the U.K. setting in which shareholder approval is imposed exogenously via a threshold test that provides strong identification. U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $ 13.6 billion over 1992-2010 in aggregate; without voting, U.K. shareholders lost $ 3 billion. Multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis supports a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer chief executive officers.