Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolton, Patrick; Freixas, Xavier; Gambacorta, Leonardo; Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Pompeu Fabra University; Bank for International Settlements (BIS); European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhw041
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2643
• 关键词: INFORMATION MONOPOLIES; BANKING RELATIONSHIPS; monetary-policy; credit; availability; multiple; debt; CONTRACTS; distance; PRIVATE

摘要

We study how relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationship banks gather information on their borrowers, allowing them to provide loans to profitable firms during a crisis. Because of the services they provide, operating costs of relationship banks are higher than those of transaction banks. Relationship banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, but offer continuation lending at more favourable terms than transaction banks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using credit register information for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers' default, we test the theoretical predictions of the model. (JEL E44, G21)