Information Sharing and Rating Manipulation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Giannetti, Mariassunta; Liberti, Jose Maria; Sturgess, Jason
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute; DePaul University; Northwestern University; University of London; Queen Mary University London
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhx050
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 3269
• 关键词: LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; Credit ratings; level evidence; incentives; MARKETS; banks; determinants; countries; defaults; models

摘要

We show that banks manipulate borrowers' credit ratings before sharing them with competing banks. Using a unique feature on the timing of information disclosure of a public credit registry, we disentangle the effect of manipulation from learning of credit ratings. We show that banks downgrade high-quality borrowers for which they have positive private information to protect their informational rents. Banks also upgrade low-quality borrowers with multiple lenders to avoid creditor runs. Our results suggest that credit ratings manipulation limits the positive effects of credit registries' information disclosure on credit allocation. (JEL G2; G14; G38)