Rational Opacity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Monnet, Cyril; Quintin, Erwan
• 署名单位: University of Bern; Study Center Gerzensee
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhx034
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 4317
• 关键词: information; INVESTMENT; PRIVATE; banks; TRANSPARENCY; TRADE; RISK

摘要

We present an environment in which long-term investors sometimes choose to restrict how much fundamental information they receive about the value of their investment to preserve its liquidity in secondary markets. When and only when there is a risk that secondary markets may be shallow, more information can reduce the expected payoff of agents who need to cash out early. Even given direct and costless control over information design, stakeholders choose to incentivize managers to withhold interim information. In such an environment, imposing transparency can lower investment and welfare.