Equity Vesting and Investment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Edmans, Alex; Fang, Vivian W.; Lewellen, Katharina A.
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhx018
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 2229
• 关键词: managerial incentives; earnings management; capital-markets; COMPENSATION; CONTRACTS; MODEL; FRAUD; FIRMS; real; link

摘要

This paper links the CEO's concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. We identify short-term concerns using the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given quarter. Vesting equity is associated with a decline in the growth of research and development and capital expenditure, positive analyst forecast revisions, and positive earnings guidance, within the same quarter. More broadly, by introducing a measure of incentives that is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by current investment opportunities, we provide evidence that CEO contracts affect real decisions.