Taxation and Dividend Policy: The Muting Effect of Agency Issues and Shareholder Conflicts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jacob, Martin; Michaely, Roni
• 署名单位: WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhx041
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 3176
• 关键词: TAX CUT; payout policy; Private Firms; life-cycle; corporate; REPURCHASES; valuation; responses; matter; GROWTH

摘要

Using proprietary data on the entire spectrum of ownership structure and exact tax status of investors and firms, we examine how dividend taxation affects payout. Utilizing an exogenous shock to dividend taxation, we show that absent any frictions, dividend taxation has a large impact on payout. As agency issues and shareholder conflicts increase, owners' tax preferences have significantly smaller impact on payout. Three mechanisms reduce the dividend-tax sensitivity: Coordination among owners, heterogeneity in tax preferences, and diverging objectives between managers and owners. Altogether, taxation has a first-order impact on payout, but agency issues and shareholder conflicts mute its impact substantially. (JEL G30, G35, H24, H25)