Do Director Elections Matter?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fos, Vyacheslav; Li, Kai; Tsoutsoura, Margarita
• 署名单位: Boston College; University of British Columbia; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhx078
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1499
• 关键词: CEO TURNOVER; corporate governance; Ownership structure; MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT; executive turnover; BOARD COMPOSITION; firm performance; STAGGERED BOARDS; PROXY CONTESTS; MARKET

摘要

Using a hand-collected sample of election nominations for more than 30,000 directors over the period 2001-2010, we construct a novel measure of director proximity to elections called Years-to-election. We find that the closer directors of a board are to their next elections, the higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is. A series of tests, including one that exploits variation in Years-to-election that comes from other boards, supports a causal interpretation. Further analyses show that other governance mechanisms do not drive the relation between board Years-to-election and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We conclude that director elections have important implications for corporate governance.