Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid for Investment Skill?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ibert, Markus; Kaniel, Ron; Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn; Vestman, Roine
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Swedish House of Finance; University of Rochester; Reichman University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhx105
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 715
• 关键词: portfolio management; ADVISORY CONTRACTS; performance; RISK; COMPENSATION; families; FLOWS

摘要

Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level fixed effects, revenues, and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation.