Industry Tournament Incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coles, Jeffrey L.; Li, Zhichuan (Frank); Wang, Albert Y.
• 署名单位: Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Western University (University of Western Ontario); University Western Ontario Hospital; Auburn University System; Auburn University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhx064
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1418
• 关键词: rank-order tournaments; managerial incentives; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; ceo turnover; STOCK; MARKET; RISK; COMPENSATION; pay; performance

摘要

We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar (industry, size) firms. We find that firm performance, firm risk, and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies are positively associated with the external industry pay gap. The industry tournament effects are stronger when industry, firm, and executive characteristics indicate high CEO mobility and a higher probability of the aspirant executive winning.