Corporate Tax Havens and Transparency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bennedsen, Morten; Zeume, Stefan
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; INSEAD Business School; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhx122
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1221
• 关键词: investor protection; debt; CONSEQUENCES; governance; OWNERSHIP; avoidance; equity; theft

摘要

We investigate shareholders' reactions to the increased transparency of corporate tax haven activities in a hand-collected subsidiary data set covering 17,331 publicly listed firms in 52 countries. An increase in transparency through the staggered signing of bilateral tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) between home countries and tax havens is associated with a 2.5% increase in the value of affected firms. The results are stronger for firms with more complex tax haven structures and weakly governed firms. Furthermore, firms that respond to TIEAs by haven hopping (i.e., they move subsidiaries from affected to nonaffected tax havens) do not experience an increase in firm value. These results are consistent with tax havens being used for expropriation activities that extend beyond pure tax-saving activities.