Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolton, Patrick; Oehmke, Martin
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhy123
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2383
• 关键词: financial institutions; Deposit insurance; debt; demand; COSTS

摘要

We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but faces implementation constraints. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up SPOE resolution ex ante. Second, when required ex post transfers are too large, national regulators ring-fence assets instead of cooperating in SPOE resolution. In this case, a multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is preassigned, is more robust. Our analysis highlights a fundamental link between efficient bank resolution, the operational structures, risks, and incentives of global banks.