The Blockchain Folk Theorem
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Biais, Bruno; Bisiere, Christophe; Bouvard, Matthieu; Casamatta, Catherine
署名单位：
Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; McGill University
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0893-9454
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/hhy095
发表日期：
2019
页码：
1662
关键词：
摘要：
Blockchains are distributed ledgers, operated within peer-to-peer networks. We model the proof-of-work blockchain protocol as a stochastic game and analyze the equilibrium strategies of rational, strategic miners. Mining the longest chain is a Markov perfect equilibrium, without forking, in line with Nakamoto (2008). The blockchain protocol, however, is a coordination game, with multiple equilibria. There exist equilibria with forks, leading to orphaned blocks and persistent divergence between chains. We also show how forks can be generated by information delays and software upgrades. Last we identify negative externalities implying that equilibrium investment in computing capacity is excessive. Received May 31, 2017; editorial decision July 6, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.
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