Risk Management Failures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouvard, Matthieu; Lee, Samuel
• 署名单位: McGill University; Santa Clara University; Swedish House of Finance
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhz115
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2468
• 关键词: deposit insurance; COMPETITION; equilibrium; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; liquidity; ECONOMICS; distance; games

摘要

We model risk management as information acquisition that delays trading decisions. In markets with preemptive competition, this can lead to a race to the bottom, where prioritizing trade execution over risk management is optimal for each firm, but collectively inefficient. As time competition intensifies, mean trading profit supplants risk concerns as the main driver of risk management quality, causing risk misallocation to rise with trading speed and volume. This pathology of risk management failure-the trio of time-consuming risk assessment, preemptive competition, and boom markets-has distinctive regulatory implications.