Do CEOs Affect Employees' Political Choices?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Babenko, Ilona; Fedaseyeu, Viktar; Zhang, Song
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Bocconi University; Boston College
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhz080
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1781
• 关键词: Campaign contributions; connections; firm

摘要

We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive 3 times more money from employees than candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs' campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with their CEOs' political preferences are more likely to leave their employer.