Industry Structure and the Strategic Provision of Trade Credit by Upstream Firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lehar, Alfred; Song, Victor Y.; Yuan, Lasheng
• 署名单位: University of Calgary; Simon Fraser University; University of Calgary
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaa002
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 4916
• 关键词: CASH HOLDINGS; collusion; COMPETITION; COMMUNICATION; governance; Suppliers; finance; MARKET; POWER; debt

摘要

Trade credit can serve as a collusion mechanism for competing supply chains to increase producer surplus in medium concentrated industries. We analyze theoretically how this form of financing influences retailers' behavior in the product market, study incentives to deviate, and show evidence consistent with the model's predictions. Trade credit use is inversely U shaped in industry concentration, and this pattern is more pronounced in industries more prone to collusion and when incentives to deviate are smaller.