Symmetry in Pay for Luck

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daniel, Naveen D.; Li, Yuanzhi; Naveen, Lalitha
• 署名单位: Drexel University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhz057
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3174
• 关键词: performance; COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; RISK; CEOS

摘要

In this study, we take a comprehensive look at asymmetry in pay for luck, which is the finding that CEOs are rewarded for good luck, but are not penalized to the same extent for bad luck. Our main takeaway, which is based on over 200 different specifications, is that there is no asymmetry in pay for luck. Our finding is important given that the literature widely accepts the idea of asymmetry in pay for luck and typically points to this as evidence of rent extraction.