Institutional Investors and Infrastructure Investing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andonov, Aleksandar; Krauss, Roman; Rauh, Joshua
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Luxembourg; Stanford University; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhab048
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3880
• 关键词: LIMITED PARTNER PERFORMANCE; PRIVATE EQUITY; INVESTMENT; returns; allocation; IMPACT; smart; RISK

摘要

Institutional investors expect infrastructure to deliver long-term stable returns but gain exposure to infrastructure predominantly through finite-horizon closed private funds. The cash flows delivered by infrastructure funds display similar volatility and cyclicality as other private equity investments, and their performance similarly depends on quick deal exits. Despite weak risk-adjusted performance and failure to match the supposed characteristics of infrastructure assets, closed funds have received more commitments over time, particularly from public investors. Public institutional investors perform worse than private institutional investors. ESG preferences and regulations explain 25-40 of their increased allocation to infrastructure and 30 of their underperformance.